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Advertising has been called everything from "the life of trade"1
to "legalized lying. ' 2  While strong opinions on the virtues of
advertising are nothing new, the modern regulatory state increasingly
furnishes a fresh legal battle ground where these opinions transform
into fierce legal arguments. Most recently, the focus of this debate has
centered on the advertising technique termed "product placement."
"Product placement is a form of promotion in which advertisers
insert branded products into programming in exchange for fees or
other consideration."3 In 2004, the total American product placement
market was worth $3.5 billion. 4 The market for television placement
alone increased forty-six percent from 2003 to reach $1.87 billion in
2004. 5 Further, "[w]hile more than 90% of product-placement dollars
1. Brainy Quotes, Calvin Coolidge Quotes, http://www.brainyquote.comlquotes/
authors/c/calvin-coolidge.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2007) (quoting President Calvin
Coolidge).
2. The Quotations Page, http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/20731.html (last
visited Jan. 9, 2007) (quoting author H.G. Wells).
3. Letter from Mary K. Engle, Associate Director for Advertising Practices, Fed.
Trade Comm'n, to Gary Ruskin, Executive Director, Commercial Alert, 6 (Feb. 10, 2005),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/050210productplacemen.pdf [hereinafter
FTC Response].
4. See Lights, Camera, Brands, ECONOMIST, Oct. 29, 2005.
5. Raymond Snoddy, Lack of Flexibility Will Kill TV Revenues, MARKETING,-Sept.
21, 2005, at 22.
DID YOU WANT FRIES WITH THAT?
are spent on film and television, even the value of placements in"
video games, Internet, music, magazines, newspapers, books and radio
was "expected to grow 18.1% to $384.9 million" in 2005.6 This
technique's rapid expansion is attributed to "increasing audience
fragmentation, advertising clutter, media multi-tasking and ad-
skipping technology."
7
By progressively integrating products into program content
beyond mere ancillary appearances, some complain that placement is
"rapidly blurring the line between content and advertising."8  The
most recent complaints, filed by consumer watchdog group
Commercial Alert, petition both the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to
promulgate regulations requiring disclosure of all television product
placements as they occur. 9 At this time, the FCC has not yet formally
responded to Commercial Alert's request, and the FTC has formally
refused to take action.1°
The FCC's sponsorship disclosure requirements "mandate[
disclosure of the fact that sponsors have paid to have their products
included within programming."'" While FCC rules do not clearly spell
out the prominence of the disclosure required, "the listening and
viewing public [must be able to] understand[ ] the nature and source
of the material they are hearing and seeing and [ ] place it in its
proper context." 12  "[M]ost television shows satisfy their legal
disclosure obligations merely by including a credit to the effect that
'promotional considerations were provided by ABC company."' 3
Arguably, these disclosures are inadequate, since "[c]redits fly by
incredibly quickly, and often shrink to a small portion of the screen."14
6. Gail Schiller, Report: Product Placements on Rise, THE HOLLYWOOD REP., July
28, 2005.
7. Id.
8. See Lights, Camera, Brands, supra note 4.
9. See Letter from Gary Ruskin, Executive Director, Commercial Alert, to Marlene
H. Dortch, Sec'y, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n (Sept. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.commercialalert.org/fcc.pdf [hereinafter FCC Complaint]; Letter from Gary
Ruskin, Executive Director, Commercial Alert, to Donald Clark, Sec'y, Fed. Trade Comm'n
17 (Sept. 30, 2003), available at http://www.commercialalert.org/ftc.pdf [hereinafter FTC
Complaint].
10. See FTC Response, supra note 3.
11. Barry M. Benjamin, Op-Ed., The Call for a Code of Conduct, MEDIAWEEK, Dec.
19, 2005; see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2005).
12. Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, "Fresh is Not as Fresh
as Frozen": A Response to the Commercialization of American Media, Address Before the
Media Institute (May 25, 2004), available at 2004 FCC LEXIS 7458, at *18.
13. Benjamin, supra note 11.
14. Id.
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Beyond Commercial Alert's complaints, various entertainment
industry groups have also argued that "current disclosures are not
meaningful, ... they do not actually inform the viewer of the product
[placement], and . . they do not satisfy the laws mandating full
disclosure."
15
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA, or "the
Act") gives the FTC authority to ban unfair or deceptive acts or
practices. 16 In its 2003 complaint, Commercial Alert argued that
product placement is "deceptive because it flies under the viewer's
skeptical radar ... [and] unfair because it is advertising that purports
to be something else."'17 The FTC's response argued that regulation
was unnecessary because product placement generally makes no "false
or misleading objective, material claims about a product's
attributes."'
8
This note argues that the structure of existing FCC and FTC
regulatory regimes is not effective in addressing challenges posed by
certain types of product placement. Thus, a specific disclosure
requirement targeting non-visual product placement is needed. Part I
presents an overview of the existing federal regulatory structure
governing product placement, and the current arguments for and
against affirmative disclosure requirements. Parts II and III identify
the various categories of product placement and argue that non-visual
placement presents unique challenges that are absent in other
categories of product placement. Finally, Part IV argues that the
current regulatory regime is insufficient, states the need for and
benefits of regulation targeting non-visual placement, and suggests
some possible disclosure requirements.
I. FEDERAL PRODUCT PLACEMENT REGULATION GENERALLY AND THE
CURRENT DEBATE
There is no governmental prohibition specifically addressing
product placement. However, the FCC's sponsorship disclosure
requirements and the FTC's unfair or deceptive act or practice
regulations are two possible regulatory constraints on the technique.' 9
15. Id. Specifically, the Writers Guild and the Screen Actors Guild have expressed
opposition to product placement's increased integration. Id.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).
17. FTC Complaint, supra note 9, at 2.
18. FTC Response, supra note 3, at 3.
19. See Matthew Savare, Note, Where Madison Avenue Meets Hollywood and Vine:
The Business, Legal, and Creative Ramifications of Product Placements, 11 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 331, 361 (2004).
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A. FCC Sponsorship Identification Regulation
It is a longstanding principle of government broadcast media
regulation that "listeners are entitled to know by whom they are being
persuaded. '20 "[A]s far back as the Radio Act of 1927 and continuing
with Section 317 of the Communications Act of 1934 there has been an
unvarying requirement that all matter broadcast by any station for a
valuable consideration is to be announced as paid for or furnished, and
by whom. ' 21 This requirement remained largely unchanged (and
generally unenforced) until amendments prompted by the 1959 payola
scandal. 22 These amendments expanded the sponsorship identification
requirement into the two-section multipart structure still in use
today. 23 Significant changes included: i) granting the FCC discretion
to develop or suspend rules; ii) extension of the legal obligation to
disclose covert promotions beyond the broadcast licensees to the
parties involved in production; and iii) barring disclosure
requirements for broadcasters' routine use of free records or props.
24
1. FCC Rulemaking
The 1961 FCC rulemaking largely tracked the language of the
1960 amendments. 25 However, a significant addition waives the
Section 317 sponsorship disclosure requirements "with respect to
feature motion picture film[s] produced initially and primarily for
theatre exhibition. 26
2. Chain of Production Disclosure
Section 317, as amended, requires "[t]he licensee of each radio
station [to] exercise reasonable diligence to obtain from its employees,
20. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, Public Notice, 40 F.C.C. 141
(1963) (explaining the 1963 sponsorship identification requirements after the payola
scandal) [hereinafter Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules].
21. Id.
22. See generally Richard Kielbowicz & Linda Lawson, Unmasking Hidden
Commercials in Broadcasting: Origins of the Sponsorship Identification Regulations, 1927-
1963, 56 FED. COMM. L.J. 329, 336-56 (2004).
23. Id.; 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2000); 47 U.S.C. § 508.
24. Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 22, at 356.
25. See id. at 359.
26. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(h) (2005). The FCC originally assumed "that all new films
were 'produced with the intent that they would at some time be broadcast by television
stations,"' and therefore should be subject to the same disclosure requirements as everyone
else. Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 22, at 366. However, after massive movie industry
protest, the FCC yielded and granted the waiver. Id.
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and from other persons with whom it deals directly in connection with
any program or program matter for broadcast, information to enable
such licensee to make the announcement required by this section."2
7
Additionally, Section 508 "encompasse[s] the whole chain of program
production and distribution; any party who [pays] to insert or accept[s]
payment to insert, covert promotions ha[s] an obligation to report this
arrangement to the next party in the chain and ultimately to the
broadcasters so they [can] air an announcement."
28
3. Free Records or Props Exception
The Section 317 sponsorship identification requirement
exempts any
service or property furnished without charge or at a nominal charge for use on, or
in connection with, a broadcast unless it is so furnished in consideration for an
identification in a broadcast of any person, product, service, trademark, or brand
name beyond an identification which is reasonably related to the use of such
service or property on the broadcast.
2 9
Thus, "when [the] matter supplied for on-air use [is] identified in the
program beyond the extent needed for the broadcast, the audience
deserve[s] to be so informed though an announcement." 30
The FCC provides thirty-six examples of what does and does
not constitute a reasonable relation.31 For example, an announcement
is not required if "[a] record distributor furnished copies of records to a
broadcast station or disc jockey for broadcast purpose," or if "[a]
refrigerator [was] furnished for use as part of the backdrop in [a]
kitchen scene . . ."32 Announcement is required if "[a] refrigerator
[was] furnished by X with the understanding that it would be used in
a kitchen scene on a dramatic show and the brand name [would] be
mentioned," or if "[a] manufacturer furnishe[d] a grand piano for use
on a concert program . . . [and] insist[ed] that [an] enlarged insignia of
its brand name be affixed over normal insignia on the piano."33
27. 47 U.S.C. § 317(c).
28. Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 22, at 363; see 47 U.S.C. § 508.
29. 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (emphasis added); see 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(a)(2).
30. Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 22, at 358.
31. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, supra note 20.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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B. FTC Unfair or Deceptive Act or Practice Regulation
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA, or "the
Act") declares unfair or deceptive acts or practices unlawful. 34 The Act
grants the FTC power to require a company " . . to affirmatively
disclose information without which the company's current
advertisements ... might deceive the public."
35
1. Deceptive Act or Practice
A deceptive act or practice consists of: 1) a "representation,
omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer"; 2) "acting
reasonably in the circumstances"; and 3) where the representation,
omission, or practice is "material."36
a. Misleading Representations and Omissions
"Most deception involves [an affirmative] oral or written
misrepresentation[ ] . . ."37 However, "[s]ome cases involve the
omission of material information, the disclosure of which is necessary
to prevent the claim, practice, or sale from being misleading."38 "[T]o
be considered misleading the undisclosed information must be
necessary to correct a material misimpression or assumption in the
minds of consumers, whether that impression is created by affirmative
acts or arises from consumers' expectations in the circumstances of the
transaction. '39 Extrinsic evidence of consumer expectations may be
required before the FTC reaches a conclusion.
40
34. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).
35. Russell J. Davis, Annotation, Power of Federal Trade Commission to Issue
Order Requiring Corrective Advertising, 46 A.L.R. FED. 905 (2002); see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
45(b); Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
36. See Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to The
Honorable John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of
Representatives, FTC Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 14, 1983), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm [hereinafter FTC Deception Statement].
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. GEORGE ERIC ROSDEN & PETER ERIC ROSDEN, 2-18C THE LAW OF ADVERTISING
(II.) (2005); see Peacock Buick, 86 F.T.C. 1532 (1975), aff'd, 553 F.2d 97 (4th Cir. 1977).
40. ROSDEN & ROSDEN, supra note 39; FTC Deception Statement, supra note 36.
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b. The Perspective of the Reasonable Consumer
"The test is whether the consumer's interpretation or reaction
is reasonable."41 This is judged from the particular standpoint of the
consumer.42 Also, where "consumers can easily evaluate the product
or service, it is inexpensive, and it is frequently purchased .... the
[FTC] will examine the practice closely before issuing a complaint
based on deception."
43
c. The Omission Must be Material (i.e. Cause an Injury)
"A 'material' misrepresentation or practice is one which is
likely to affect a consumer's choice of or conduct regarding a
product."44  Actual or constructive knowledge of a false claim or
necessary omission results in a presumption of materiality.45 "[I]njury
and materiality are different names for the same concept."
46
2. Unfair Act or Practice
An act or practice is unfair under the FTCA if it 1) injures
consumers, or 2) violates public policy.
47
a. Consumer Injury
The injury: i) must be "substantial"; ii) must not be one
consumers could "reasonably have avoided"; and iii) must not be
"outweighed" either by "countervailing benefits to consumers" or by
"competition that the practice produces." 48
The most common cases of substantial injury are cases
involving monetary harm, such as "when sellers coerce consumers into
purchasing unwanted goods or services. . .49 "Emotional impact and






47. Letter from Michael Pertschuk, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to The
Honorable Wendell H. Ford, Chairman, Consumer Subcomm., Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transp., FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness (Dec. 17, 1980), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm [hereinafter FTC Unfairness Statement].
48. Id.
49. Id.
DID YOU WANT FRIES WITH THAT?
other more subjective types of harm, on the other hand, will not
ordinarily make a practice unfair."
50
The FTC normally relies on consumers' ability to make their
own private purchasing decisions and correct the market without
regulation. 51 "However, it has long been recognized that certain types
of sales techniques may prevent consumers from effectively making
their own decisions, and that corrective action may then become
necessary."
52
"The [FTC] ... takes account of the various costs that a remedy
would entail," and "will not find that a practice unfairly injures
consumers unless it is injurious in its net effects." 53
b. Public Policy Violation
To the extent that the [FTC] relies heavily on public policy to support a finding of
unfairness ... the policy should be declared or embodied in formal sources such as
statutes, judicial decisions, or the Constitution as interpreted by the courts, rather
than being ascertained by some general sense of the national values.
54
3. Commercial Speech
Although no federal court has addressed whether product
placement constitutes commercial speech, several commentators have
identified it as such.55  Commercial speech is protected from
burdensome regulation by the Supreme Court's intermediate scrutiny
test synthesized in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York. 56 Under the test, if the speech is not
misleading or related to unlawful activity,57 the courts must ask
whether: 1) the "asserted governmental interest is substantial"; 2) "the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted"; and








55. See Savare, supra note 19, at 369.
56. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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D. The Fight Over Agency Regulation
1. Arguments For Regulation
a. The CSC Complaint
In 1991 the Center for the Study of Commercialism (CSC)
submitted to the FTC a complaint and request for investigation and
rulemaking regarding motion picture product placement. 59 Citing the
FTC's criticism of infomercials, the complaint argued that movie
product placements were a similarly deceptive act or practice under
Section 5 of the FTCA "because they exploit the relaxed sensibilities
and less vigilant and critical attitude of the movie audience."
60
Additionally, the CSC argued that product placements are not only
likely to mislead the consumer, but are "designed with the intent to
deceive.. ."61
The CSC recommended two separate remedial rule
structures. 62 For films directed at adults, the organization suggested
requiring producers to attach a clear audio and visual notice
immediately before the start of any film, apprising the audience of the
paid advertisements therein.63 For films directed at children, the CSC
suggested a complete ban on paid product placements.
64
b. Commercial Alert's Complaints
More recently, Commercial Alert (CA) petitioned both the FCC
and the FTC to require adequate disclosure of product placement on
television.65 CA's FCC complaint alleged specific wrongdoing by
"ABC, Inc., CBS Television, Fox Broadcasting Company, Fox Sports
Networks LLC, National Broadcasting Company, Inc., United
Paramount Network, Walt Disney Co. and the WB Television
Network."66 Specifically CA attacked various new forms of product
59. See Center for the Study of Commercialism, Complaint and Request for
Investigation and Rulemaking, May 30, 1991, 1991 FTC LEXIS 557 [hereinafter CSC
Complaint].
60. Id. at 11.
61. Id. at 16.
62. Id. at 18-19.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 19.
65. See FCC Complaint, supra note 9; FTC Complaint, supra note 9.
66. FCC Complaint, supra note 9 at 1.
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placement, which it identified as paid spokespersons, 67 product
integration, 68 plot placement, 69 and virtual advertising.
70
Addressing the FCC, CA complained that "[t]elevision stations
... cram their programs with product placements, yet fail to identify
the sponsors in a conspicuous way [thereby] violating the public's
right to know who is seeking to persuade them."71 CA further argued
that FCC Rule 73.1212, "as currently written, is not adequate to the
new challenges posed by embedded advertising" and should be
changed.72
In its FTC complaint, CA argued that product placement
should be considered an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the
meaning of the FTCA. 73 "It is deceptive because it flies under the
viewer's skeptical radar. It is unfair because it is advertising that
purports to be something else." 74 CA cited three instances where the
FTC had required disclosure that an advertisement was in fact an
advertisement: 1) infomercials masquerading as independent
programming; 2) misleading formats where ads pose as articles in
magazines or newspapers; and 3) search engine results that are paid
ads in disguise.7 5 Additionally, the petition argued that marketing-
related diseases in children constituted the "substantial injury"
necessary for an unfairness finding. 76 Specifically, CA alleged child
injury from soft drinks, fast food, beer, tobacco, and gambling related
product placements.
77
67. "Such stars as Lauren Bacall, Rob Lowe and Kathleen Turner have promoted
specific drugs on TV programs such as NBC's Today show and the Montel Williams Show,
often without disclosing that they were paid by pharmaceutical companies, or had other
financial ties to them." Id at 5.
68. Product integration involves introducing a product as a regular part of a show.
For example, in FOX's American Idol, "Coke had its logo-ed beverage cups in front of the
three judges, [and] had the traditional green room renamed the 'Coca-Cola Red Room"' Id.
(quoting Wayne Friedman, Madison + Vine: Product Integrators Tackle Learning Curve;
Marriages Of Marketers, Media Are Hot, But Risks Are Still Plenty, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct.
21, 2002).
69. Plot placement occurs when a product is written into the plotline. For example,
"NBC is integrating Avon's new cosmetics line, 'Mark,' into the plotline of its soap opera,
Passions." Id. at 7.
70. Virtual advertising involves digitally inserting product placements into "reruns
of syndicated TV programs, sports programs, dramas, and even news footage." Id. at 8.
71. Id. at2.
72. Id. at 3-4.
73. FTC Complaint, supra note 9.
74. Id. at 1.
75. Id. at 2-3.
76. Id. at 10.
77. Id. at 12-15.
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CA suggested that both the FCC and FTC require prominent
identification of product placements "when they occur," because "[t]he
impact of product placement . . occurs at the moment of exposure."
78
They added that "[t]his should be in addition to disclosure at the
outset of the program."
79
2. Arguments Against Regulation
a. The Freedom to Advertise Coalition Opposition
On November 12, 2003, the Freedom to Advertise Coalition
(FAC) filed two oppositions to CA's petitions.80 The FAC argued that
"[p]roduct placement is advertising that is protected by the
commercial speech doctrine."81 FAC then claimed that CA's petitions
did not "identify a strong enough governmental interest," or show
"that product placement is unlawful or misleading," and therefore did
not pass constitutional muster.8
2
The FAC also alleged CA's "proposal that product placements
be identified with 'pop-up' disclosures whenever such placements
occur would destroy the artistic integrity of any program containing
such speech, and would be a nuisance to the viewer."8 3
b. The Washington Legal Foundation Opposition
In March of 2004, the Washington Legal Foundation (WLF)
filed comments with the FTC concerning CA's petition, in which it
78. FCC Complaint, supra note 9, at 4; see FTC Complaint, supra note 9, at 2.
79. FCC Complaint, supra note 9, at 4.
80. Letter from Darryl Nirenberg, Counsel, Freedom to Advertise Coalition, and
Penelope Farthing, Counsel, Freedom to Advertise Coalition, to Donald Clark, Secretary,
Federal Trade Commission, Opposition to Request for Investigation of Product Placement
on Television and for Guidelines to Require Adequate Disclosure of TV Product Placement
(Nov. 12, 2003), available at http://www.ana.net/news/2003/FTC-letter.pdf [hereinafter
FTC Opposition]; Letter from Darryl Nirenberg, Counsel, Freedom to Advertise Coalition,
and Penelope Farthing, Counsel, Freedom to Advertise Coalition, to Marlene H. Dortch,
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, Opposition to Petition for Rulemaking
related to Disclosure of Product Placement on Television, (Nov. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.ana.netnews/2003/FCCletter.pdf [hereinafter FCC Opposition] ("The Freedom
to Advertise Coalition . . . is a not-for-profit organization of advertising, publishing and
media associations committed to the protection of the First Amendment right to truthfully
advertise all legal products and services.").
81. FCC Opposition, supra note 80, at 6; FTC Opposition, supra note 80, at 5.
82. FCC Opposition, supra note 80, at 6; FTC Opposition, supra note 80, at 5.
83. FCC Opposition, supra note 80, at 3 (emphasis in original); see FTC Opposition,
supra note 80, at 4.
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asserted that CA failed to demonstrate the harm necessary to a
finding of unfairness or deception under the FTCA.8 4 The WLF noted
that CA's objection to placements for soft drinks, fast food, and beer
"appeare[d] to be the commercial promotion of those products at all,
not their promotion through product placements."85  The comments
also identified product placement as commercial speech and claimed




Although the FCC has not formally responded to CA's petition,
Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein has spoken out against product
placement on various occasions.8 7 For example, in a May 2004 speech
before the Media Institute, Commissioner Adelstein stated that "it is a
cardinal right for Americans to have the commercial elements of radio
and TV broadcasting clearly marked and made explicit to even
undiscerning viewers and listeners."88 Additionally on May 12, 2005,
Commissioner Adelstein testified before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science & Transportation, expressing "concern[ ] that
there seems to be a lack of awareness of the need for disclosure under
[FCC] rules" regarding undisclosed product placements.8 9 Further, he
has called for increased public involvement by asking people to record
suspected violations and to send formal complaints to the FCC. 90
84. Letter from Daniel J. Popeo and David Price, Washington Legal Found., to Mr.
Donald S. Clark, Sec'y, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Comments of the Washington Legal
Foundation to the Federal Trade Commission Concerning Television Product Placement,
(Mar. 26, 2004), available at http://www.wlf.org/uploadFTC%20product%20placement
%20comments.pdf [hereinafter WLF Comments]. 'WLF is a public interest law and policy
center with members and supporters in all 50 states. It devotes a substantial portion of its
resources to advocating for reasonableness in government regulations, including in the
areas of advertising and other avenues of commercial speech." Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Benjamin, supra note 11.
88. Adelstein, supra note 12, at 20.
89. Pre-packaged News Stories, Hearing on S.967 Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science & Transp., 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Jonathan S. Adelstein),
available at 2005 FCC LEXIS 3084, at *2-3.
90. Jonathan S. Adelstein, Comm'r, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks at the
National Conference for Media Reform (May 14, 2005), available at 2005 FCC LEXIS 2949,
at *2-3.
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b. FTC Response
On February 10, 2005, the FTC formally responded to CA's
petition stating that "it does not appear that failure to identify the
placement as advertising violates Section 5 of the FTC Act."91 In fact,
"[t]he principal reason for identifying an advertisement as such is that
consumers may give more credence to objective representations about
a product's performance or other attributes if made by an independent
third party than if made by the advertiser itself."92 The FTC then
noted that CA's petition had not suggested that consumers were
"giving more credence to objective claims."93 "Indeed, in product
placement, few objective claims appear to be made about the product's
performance or attributes. That is, in most instances the product
appears on-screen ... or is mentioned, but the product's performance
is not discussed."94 Addressing CA's child injury argument, the FTC
stated that "[i]f no objective claims are made for the product, then
there is no claim as to which greater credence could be given;
therefore, even from an ordinary child's standpoint, consumer injury
from an undisclosed paid product placement seems unlikely."
95
The FTC also noted "that consumer vulnerability to new
advertising techniques that pose a risk of deception may diminish
with time as consumers become accustomed to the technique."96 The
response concluded:
. . . there may be instances in which the line between advertising and
programming may be blurred, and consumers would be deceived absent a
disclosure clarifying that a communication is an advertisement. However, we
believe that the existing statutory and regulatory framework provides sufficient
tools for challenging any such deceptive acts or practices.
97
II. CATEGORIZING PRODUCT PLACEMENT
There are no generally accepted categories or terms used to
identify types of product placement. 9  Thus, for clarity and
consistency, this section attempts to formulate an endogenous
identification and categorization system.
91. FTC Response, supra note 3, at 2.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 3.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 4.
96. Id. at 2 n.2.
97. Id. at 5.
98. Compare Doreen Carvajal, Placing the Product in the Dialogue, Too, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2006, at C9, with FCC Complaint, supra note 9.
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A. Product Placement and Product Integration
Many commentators distinguish between product placement
and product integration. 99 However, the line separating these two
concepts is far from clear. In fact, many use the terms
interchangeably, and neither term elicits a customary definition. 100
The President of the Writers Guild of America interprets the
distinction by defining product placement as "simply putting a
branded box of cereal on the kitchen table in a show" and product
integration as "having the characters talk about the crunchy
deliciousness of the cereal or provoking them to go out and tell their
neighbors to buy that cereal."'' 1 Either way the product is finding its
way into the show. Thus, the distinction is unnecessary, and the
remainder of this note refers to all activities in which "advertisers
insert branded products into programming in exchange for fees or
other consideration" 10 2 as product placement.
B. Visual, Non-Visual, and Mixed Product Placement
Product placement may consist of purely visual elements
(visual placement), purely non-visual elements (non-visual
placement),. or a combination of both (mixed placement). 10 3
Visual placement usually involves a physical or graphic
product in use by a character on-screen or shown as a static prop. 10 4
For example, The Best Damn Sports Show Period has "feature[d] a bar
decked out with ... neon signs . . . [advertising] Rolling Rock, Labatt
Blue and Dos Equis."'0 5  Additionally, "each day a dinner from
Outback Steakhouse is delivered to the set as the hosts discuss the
sports news of the day."'0 6 Similarly the American Idol judges drink
out of Coca-Cola "logo-ed beverage cups."10 7
Non-visual placement involves a product, brand name, or
company alluded to either orally or in writing. 0 8 For example, in
99. See Carvajal, supra note 98.
100. See FCC Complaint, supra note 9, at 2.
101. Carvajal, supra note 98.
102. FTC Response, supra note 3, at 1 (defining product placement).
103. See Savare, supra note 19.
104. See id.
105. FTC Complaint, supra note 9, at 6.
106. Nat Ives, The Media Business: Advertising; Television Shows like 'Nike
Training Camp' Widen the Scope of Product Placements, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2003, at C8.
107. FTC Complaint, supra note 9, at 4.
108. See Savare, supra note 19, at 356.
20061
482 VANDERBILT J OF ENTERTAINMENTAND TECH LAW [Vol. 9:2:467
spring of 2005, AdAge.com "reported that McDonald's Corp. had hired
an entertainment marketing firm" to find hip-hop artists willing to
mention "Big Mac" in their lyrics. 10 9 Artists would not be paid
upfront, but would receive $1 to $5 per radio play. 110 Additionally,
McDonalds would have "final content approval of any lyrics
incorporating the Big Mac to ensure that it's in an appropriate
setting."'' The deal was scrapped due to the AdAge.com leak."1
2
However, the marketing firm responsible, Maven Strategies, had
previously brokered a deal "with Seagram's, where the name of its gin
was worked into rap songs by such artists as Kanye West and Petey
Pablo." 3 "In Petey's massive 2004 hit 'Freek-A-Leek,'. . . he winds up
with the line, 'Now, I got to give a shout-out to Seagram's Gin. 'Cause
I drink it, and they payin' for it."
' 1 4
Similarly, a few years ago Italian jewelry company Bulgari
paid British writer Fay Weldon for a prominent place in her 2002
novel, which she aptly titled The Bulgari Connection.1 5 The deal
required that Ms. Weldon "mention Bulgari at least a dozen times."
6
Further, "[s]uch stars as Lauren Bacall, Rob Lowe and
Kathleen Turner have promoted specific drugs on TV programs such
as NBC's Today show and the Montel Williams Show, often without
disclosing that they were paid by pharmaceutical companies, or had
other financial ties to them."" 7
Finally, mixed placement involves an oral or written product or
brand reference that coincides with the visual presentation or use of
that brand or product."18 For instance, the WB's show Pepsi Smash
uses Pepsi's name and Pepsi's "multi-colored swirl" as its logo. 1 9
Further, the Wall Street Journal reported that during a product
review segment on NBC's Today show, Hewlett-Packard and Eastman
109. Renee Graham, Slip a Big Mac Into a Rap, Get a Check From Ronald, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 5, 2005, at Cl.
110. Id.
111. Todd Wasserman, Playing The Hip-Hop Name Drop, BRANDWEEK, July 25,
2005.
112. Snoddy, supra note 5.
113. Graham, supra note 109; Snoddy, supra note 5.
114. Graham, supra note 109.
115. David D. Kirkpatrick, Now, Many Words From Our Sponsor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
3, 2001, at Al.
116. Id.
117. FTC Complaint, supra note 9, at 4-5.
118. See Savare, supra note 19, at 356.
119. FTC Complaint, supra note 9, at 6.
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Kodak Co. paid reviewers to praise their products without disclosing
that the reviewers were being paid.120
III. FAILING THE TESTS: WHAT MAKES UNDISCLOSED NON-VISUAL
PRODUCT PLACEMENT UNLAWFUL
A. Failing the Sponsorship Disclosure Requirements
"CBS [CEO] Leslie Moonves . . .was supposedly quoted as
saying that some shows will do product placement so well that 'you're
hardly aware that you've been sold something."' 121 This statement
hardly seems consistent with the "principle that listeners are entitled
to know by whom they are being persuaded."'122 FCC sponsorship
disclosure regulations require that "all matter broadcast by any
station for a valuable consideration is to be announced as paid for or
furnished, and by whom."'123 However the type or degree of disclosure
required is not specified, 124 and two conditional exceptions exist.1 25
1. The Prop and Free Records Exception
As stated above, the prop exception exempts any
service or property furnished without charge or at a nominal charge for use on, or
in connection with, a broadcast unless it is so furnished in consideration for an
identification in a broadcast of any person, product, service, trademark, or brand
name beyond an identification which is reasonably related to the use of such
service or property on the broadcast. 
12 6
The FCC added this exception in 1960 after massive radio and
television industry protests against FCC's announcement that free
records, free props, and other free matter commonly supplied for
programming would be interpreted as triggering the Section 317
120. Jube Shiver Jr., FCC Asks for Help on Stealth TV Ads, L.A. TIMES, June 15,
2005, at C3.
121. Benjamin, supra note 11.
122. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, supra note 20.
123. Id.
124. Benjamin, supra note 11.
125. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.1212(a), 73.1212(f) (2005). This does not include the film
exception in § 73.1212(h) (which waives disclosure requirements for any announcement
otherwise "required by Section 317(b) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended ....
with respect to feature motion picture film[s] produced initially and primarily for theatre
exhibition." ) because this blanket waiver is not conditioned upon the placement's content
and is therefore irrelevant for the purpose of this note. Id. § 73.1212(h).
126. 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
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disclosure requirement. 127 This uproar is understandable considering
that most product placement "deals involve the content creator
'bartering' exposure for free goods from the manufacturer." 128 Visual
placement often stems from the need for props, and the consequent
visual identification naturally result from the products provided.'
29
Thus, visual placement often complies with these regulations.
However, a non-visual product mention is ancillary to almost
any possible use of a tangible product. Since use of tangible goods
does not usually necessitate a non-visual reference, it follows that
most such identifications are not reasonably related to a product's
broadcast use. For example, identification is not reasonably related to
broadcast use where a "refrigerator is furnished by X with the
understanding that it will be used in a kitchen scene in a dramatic
show and . . . [d]uring the course of the program the actress says:
'Donald go get the meat from my new X refrigerator."' 130 However,
identification is reasonably related where "[a] Coca-Cola distributor
furnishes a Coca-Cola dispenser for use as a prop in a drugstore
scene."1
3 1
It may be argued that products are necessary as prizes for
radio giveaways or to enable product reviews, and in those situations
a non-visual product mention would be reasonably related to the use
of the product. 132 However, these few aberrations do not negate the
common-sense reality that the prop exception stems primarily from
the practical need for props and the consequent visual identifications
of the products filling that need.
2. The Commercial Advertisement Exception
A second exception exists, "[i]n the case of broadcast matter
advertising commercial products or services, [for] an announcement
stating the sponsor's corporate or trade name, or the name of the
sponsor's product, when it is clear that the mention of the name of the
product constitutes a sponsorship identification . . ."133 The FCC has
interpreted this exception as applying only "when a sponsor and
127. Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 22, at 357.
128. Savare, supra note 19, at 357.
129. See id.
130. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, supra note 20.
131. Id.
132. See id. In these instances identification is necessary and reasonably related to
the product's use. Id.
133. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212(f) (2005) (emphasis added).
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commercial product are clearly connected."134  This exception may
rationally apply to traditional advertisements where the broadcast
matter's commercial nature is known and contextually enables a
product mention to suggest sponsorship.
However, it fails to adequately address non-visual product
placement that offers the public no way of delineating between
advertisement and program. 135 For example, without disclosure even
the most discerning listener cannot distinguish between a rapper paid
to mention "Big Mac" from the same rapper's voluntary cultural or
aesthetic reference to "Courvosier."1 36  Similarly, no viewer can
separate a talk-show host's (or guest's) usual banter from a sponsored
product mention. 137 Even where the sponsor and product are clearly
connected, the public is unable to determine whether the sponsor was
paid for that particular non-visual mention (as opposed to a
traditional advertisement where payment is assumed from the
context). 138 Thus, an undisclosed non-visual placement will arguably
never clearly indicate sponsorship.
It may be argued that the public can guess the commercial
nature and source of a product placement. However, "it is a cardinal
right for Americans to have the commercial elements of radio and TV
broadcasting clearly marked and made explicit to even undiscerning
viewers and listeners."139 Thus, non-visual placement always requires
a separate announcement.
B. Failing the Unfair or Deceptive Act or Practice Regulations
"[U]nfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce, are declared . . . unlawful."140 A deceptive act or practice
consists of: 1) a "representation, omission or practice that is likely to
mislead the consumer"; 2) "acting reasonably in the circumstances"; 3)
where the representation, omission or practice is "material."141
134. In re Classical Acquisition Ltd. P'ship, 12 F.C.C.R. 1869, 1 (1997).
135. See Adelstein, supra note 12, at 13-14.
136. This example refers to a product mentioned within the content of a song rather
than a rapper who appears on a commercial. Product placement is, by definition, outside of
traditional advertisement, and thus a paid spokesperson appearing in a thirty-second
commercial and mentioning a product is not product placement. See FTC Response, supra
note 3, at 1.
137. See Adelstein, supra note 12, at 13-14 ("Listeners are left wondering if the on-
air personality really liked the product, or whether the station was paid to promote it.").
138. See id.
139. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
140. 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) (2000).
141. FTC Deception Statement, supra note 36.
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Further, an act is unfair if it: 1) injures consumers; or 2) violates
public policy.142
For example, in Kerran v. Federal Trade Commission, the
Tenth Circuit upheld the FTC's order requiring petitioners to stop
"selling . . . re-refined [lubricating] oil without indicating on the
containers or otherwise that the commodity is produced from
previously used oil."143 The petitioners argued that "contamination...
[and] additives put into the oil by the prior producer are eliminated by
the re-refining process . . . and that such re-refined product is the
equivalent in quality of [new] lubricating oil ... ,"144 The FTC found
that "a substantial portion of the public who purchase lubricating oil
prefer new and unused oil to that produced by . . . re-refining...
The FTC also found "that the failure of petitioners to disclose that
their oil is made from previously used oil ha[d] a tendency and
capacity to mislead and deceive a substantial portion of the
purchasing public into the belief that such oil [was] new and
unused."
146
A similar order, upheld in Brite Manufacturing Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, prohibited the petitioners from selling watches
made with Japanese watch bands where the mark of foreign origin
was not visible due to packaging.1 47 The FTC found "[t]hat there are
among the members of the purchasing public a substantial number
who have a preference for products originating in the United States
over products originating in foreign countries."1 48 The FTC then found
"[t]hat when the country of origin of merchandise offered for sale in
the United States is not marked or if so marked, the markings are
concealed, the purchasing public or a substantial segment thereof
understands and believes such products to be wholly of domestic
origin."149  Thus, in both cases a material omission resulting in a
misleading expectation necessitated disclosure.
In their response to Commercial Alert's arguments, the FTC
noted that paid product placements were lawful because "in most
instances the product appears on-screen . . . or is mentioned, but the
product's performance is not discussed."150 Thus, where a product is
142. FTC Unfairness Statement, supra note 47.
143. 265 F.2d 246, 247 (10th Cir. 1959).
144. Id. at 248.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 347 F.2d 477, 478 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. FTC Response, supra note 3, at 3.
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not discussed, no misleading representation concerning the product
occurs. 151  However, where the product itself contains a product
placement, the lack of disclosure can constitute an unfair or deceptive
omission. For instance, a consumer acting reasonably under the
circumstances may assume that a CD he or she is purchasing is free of
any product placement. This expectation is reasonable since product
placement is not historically present in music. 152  Further, it is
possible that this consumer may be unwilling to purchase a CD
containing a non-visual placement. 153 However, without disclosure,
this consumer may rely upon his or her faulty assumption and
purchase the CD. This omission is material because it is "likely to
affect a consumer's choice of or conduct regarding a product."'154 Thus,
as a result of reasonable consumer expectations, this material
omission violates the deceptive act or practice regulations.1 55
Similarly, the omission constitutes an unfair act or practice
injuring consumers. This omission may result in a "substantial injury
involv[ing] a monetary harm as when sellers coerce customers into
purchasing unwanted goods or services."1 56 Additionally, the injury is
not reasonably avoidable by consumers because the omission
"prevent[s] consumers from effectively making their own decisions."'157
Further, the injury is not outweighed by any benefit to consumers or
by competition produced by the practice. 58 Finally, this omission
violates public policy underlying the Federal Communications Act




152. See Krissah Williams, In Hip-Hop, Making Name-Dropping Pay, WASH. POST,
Aug. 29, 2005, at Dl. Reasonableness is judged from the targeted consumer's standpoint.
FTC Deception Statement, supra note 36, at 3.
153. Even if the consumer is willing to purchase the CD, the consumer may attach a
negative monetary value to the presence of product placement, and if fully informed the
consumer may be unwilling to pay the CD's requested price.
154. FTC Deception Statement, supra note 36.
155. Id.
156. FTC Unfairness Statement, supra note 47.
157. Id.
158. Id. As argued below, non-visual placement does not fill an already existing
production need, and thus its absence is unlikely to pass higher prices on to the consumer.
For example, the McDonald's deal mentioned above was structured so that payment was
contingent upon radio airplay. Graham, supra note 109. Thus it is unlikely that this
uncertain revenue stream would be figured into the initial price of the CD containing the
song at issue. Further, this note argues below that an affirmative disclosure requirement
will actually reduce administrative costs.
159. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, supra note 20.
2006]
488 VANDERBILTJ. OF ENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW [Vol. 9:2:467
It may be argued that "consumer vulnerability to new
advertising techniques that pose a risk of deception may diminish
with time as consumers become accustomed to the technique.' 160
Thus, the public's expectations may change as non-visual placement
becomes more prevalent, and the lack of disclosure will no longer be
deceptive or misleading.
161
However, this argument ignores how consumers form
expectations regarding the different forms of product placement.
Specifically, consumer expectation and acceptance of visual product
placement pragmatically result from the need for props. 162 A public
that is aware of both the existence of product placement and the need
for props must rationally conclude that at least some of the props in a
DVD it purchases were provided by product manufacturers. 163 After
all, why would a producer pay for a prop when product placement
deals are readily available? Thus, knowing that every car chase
requires a car, most consumers would likely expect an actual product
would be provided to fill that role. Additionally, accepting products in
exchange for on-screen exposure creates an effective means for
producers and studios to reduce production costs.164 It is this reality
that necessitated the FCC motion picture and prop exceptions. 65 This
need accounts for consumer acceptance and expectation of product
placement in movies and television.
In comparison, a CD, book, periodical, or videogame producer
needs no tangible props. Even a movie or television show doesn't
require an oral product reference. The cheapest substitute for a paid
non-visual product mention is an unpaid non-visual product mention
which, unlike a prop, does not result in substitution costs. Without
the need for tangible goods, the consumer may rationally assume that
any non-visual product mention is made for purely cultural or
aesthetic effect. Even if a consumer skeptically expected a paid non-
visual placement to be present in every product, at least two instances
may alter consumer expectation.
First, the source of the product may alter consumer
expectations. For example, consumers may not usually base their
decision to purchase a DVD upon the movie's producer or director.
However, consumers almost certainly base their decision to purchase a
160. FTC Response, supra note 3, at 2 n.2.
161. See id.
162. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 22, at 357-58; Savare, supra note 19, at
357.
163. Thus the public can figure this information into its purchasing decision.
164. Savare, supra note 19, at 357.
165. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 22, at 357.
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CD, book, or periodical on the musical group, author, or publication
respectively. Where each movie by one studio is usually a new entity,
each musical group, author, or periodical acts as a brand. This may
become problematic if a consumer purchasing a CD, book, or periodical
is unable to identify the presence of a non-visual placement, and
rationally assumes that future works from that source would not
contain a placement.
Second, a consumer may listen to a song on the radio or
preview a free MP3 version before purchasing a CD or MP3. 166 In
these cases a consumer unable to identify any non-visual placements
may assume their absence. Further, this consumer may detrimentally
rely upon this assumption and purchase a product that he or she
otherwise would not buy.
Thus, as in Kerran and Brite Manufacturing, disclosure of
placements should be required if the FTC determines that a
substantial amount of the purchasing public prefers products without
placement, and that without notice the public will be misled into
faulty and injurious assumptions. 167 While the FTC must draw upon
its extensive experience while analyzing these public preferences, the
rise of ad-skipping devices and ever more ingenious integration
strategies strongly indicate that Americans prefer their media
products without the ads. 168
C. Why the Commercial Speech Exception Does Not Protect Non-Visual
Placement
Both the Freedom to Advertise Coalition and the Washington
Legal Foundation have argued that product placement is commercial
speech protected by the First Amendment. 69 No court has found that
166. Similarly a consumer may preview a movie in the theater before purchasing the
DVD version.
167. See Brite Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Kerran v. FTC, 265
F.2d 246 (10th Cir. 1959).
168. FTC Deception Statement, supra note 36; see Lights, Camera, Brands, supra
note 4 ("[A]dvertisers are pushing their way into content far more aggressively than ever
before. This is chiefly because they doubt the effectiveness of 30-second spot
advertisements. Increasingly, viewers are using personal video recorders to skip them, or
are choosing to pay for content without commercials."). It is remotely possible that the
Commission could find that consumers prefer product placement. In that case, the
material omission may still injure the consumer. For example, a consumer that really
loves placement may purchase a rap CD assuming that all product mentions are paid-for.
If these mentions are really unpaid cultural references then this consumer may not have
purchased the CD and will have incurred a material injury.
169. FCC Opposition, supra note 80, at 6; WLF Comments, supra note 84, at 2.
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product placement qualifies as commercial speech. 170 Non-visual
product placement in particular would not qualify for protection under
the Supreme Court's test in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission of New York. 171 The Central Hudson Court
describes "[t]he First Amendment's concern for commercial speech [as]
based on the informational function of advertising."172 Thus, under
Central Hudson, speech that is either misleading or related to
unlawful activity is not protected under the First Amendment. 173
Consequently, "[t]he government may ban forms of communication
more likely to deceive the public than to inform it."'
174
The FTC has noted that "in most instances the product appears
on-screen or is mentioned, but the product's performance is not
discussed."'175 If the product is not discussed, then the placement can
hardly be said to contain any informational value. Further, as argued
above, undisclosed non-visual placements are misleading and fail to
inform the public that they are advertisements. Finally, even if a
placement were not misleading or deceptive, it has been persuasively
argued that a mandatory disclosure requirement (as compared to a
complete ban) would pass muster under Central Hudson's
intermediate scrutiny. 176
IV. WHY AN AFFIRMATIVE DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT TARGETING
NON-VISUAL PLACEMENT IS A NECESSARY AND VIABLE SOLUTION
A. The Need for an Affirmative Disclosure Requirement Targeting
Non-Visual Placement
When presented with a product placement complaint, the FCC
and FTC investigate whether the placement violates the sponsorship
identification regulations or the unfair or deceptive act or practice
regulations respectively. 177 These broad regulations police everything
from posting minimum octane numbers on gasoline dispensing
170. Savare, supra note 19, at 369.
171. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
172. 447 U.S. at 563.
173. Id. at 566.
174. Id. at 563.
175. FTC Response, supra note 3, at 3.
176. See Steven L. Snyder, Note, Movies and Product Placement: Is Hollywood
Turning Films Into Commercial Speech?, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 333-34.
177. See FCC Complaint, supra note 9; FTC Complaint, supra note 9.
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pumps 178 to wireless communications services. 179 Despite their broad
scope, the FCC regulations do not spell out disclosure specifics and the
FTC regulations do not require disclosure.180 In their complaints, both
CA and the CSC argued that the existing regulatory structure does
not effectively address product placement's rapid growth, and
suggested new regulation establishing a bright line disclosure
requirement for all product placements. 8 1 This section argues that
while existing regulations are indeed ineffective, disclosure
requirements should only target non-visual placement.
1. The Current Regulatory Structure is Insufficient
The current regulatory structure is no longer viable or efficient
due to the increasing scope and breadth of product placement. CBS
Chairman Leslie Moonves recently stated that "three-quarters of all
scripted [television] . . . will soon contain product placement."18 2 In
2004, the total American product placement market was already
worth $3.5 billion.18 3 Only midway through its 2005-2006 television
season, NBC had "8,757 total product placement occurrences on its
shows, according to . . . Nielson Product Placement Service."
18 4
Currently, each complaint warranting an investigation must be
analyzed under context-specific agency standards determining both
compliance with underlying regulations 8 5  and sufficiency of
disclosure.18 6 This case-by-case method is no longer viable in light of
product placement's massive volume and rapid growth. Additionally,
agency resources are spent equally on every category of placement
regardless of each category's individual potential for deception. The
inefficiency resulting from this approach could be decreased by
targeting consistently offending placement categories.
178. See FTC Unfairness Statement, supra note 47, at 3 & n.21 (citing the posting of
minimum octane numbers as an example of an unfair practice regulated by the FTC).
179. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 27.1 (2005).
180. Benjamin, supra note 11; FTC Response, supra note 3.
181. See FCC Complaint, supra note 9; CSC Complaint, supra note 59.
182. Lights, Camera, Brands, supra note 4.
183. See id.
184. Peter Lauria, Placement & the Rise of Scripted Coca-Cola, N.Y. POST, Jan. 8,
2006, at 29.
185. See, e.g., FTC Response, supra note 3 (describing the rules for determining
what is a "deceptive practice" under the FTC Act).
186. See Shiver, supra note 120 (noting FCC policies encouraging disclosure of
payment for product placement).
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2. Benefits of a Targeted Affirmative Disclosure Requirement
A disclosure requirement targeting non-visual placement will
put the public and the chain of production on notice as to exactly what
types of placement are improper. In a recent speech, FCC
Commissioner Adelstein referred to viewers as "troops that can and
will call corporate media into account" by identifying and recording
undisclosed product placements. 8 7 Admittedly, relying on public
recognition when undisclosed non-visual placements are almost
always unrecognizable does not seem sensible. However, as with the
leaked "Big Mac" deal described above, industry insiders often report
undisclosed non-visual placements. Without targeting categories of
placement, these insiders must guess as to whether the agency would
find a context-specific situation lawful. Where reporting such
violations may involve risk, vague regulations will not incentivize the
necessary public enforcement.
Additionally, by establishing a specific bright line disclosure
rule, agency investigations can focus on whether the required
disclosure is present rather than on whether disclosure is sufficient.
Thus, targeted regulation will increase investigatory efficiency by
conserving agency time and resources. Increased efficiency will also
permit agencies to shift their efforts from investigation to
identification and enforcement.
3. The Target Should be Limited to Non-Visual Placement
In their FTC complaint, the CSC suggested a pre-movie audio-
visual notice of all brand names and companies placed in the film. 88
Similarly, CA requested that both the FCC and FTC require visual
notice of a placement as it occurs in addition to disclosure at the outset
of the program. 8 9  Because they address all forms of product
placement, these requests are both unrealistic and unreasonable. For
example, the CSC's complaint noted that product placements in the
movie Home Alone contained thirty-one different brand-names. 190 It is
unreasonable to assume that an audience would be willing or able to
absorb and recall a lengthy notice identifying thirty-one sponsors.
Further, as product placements become more prevalent, this solution
would become unbearably cumbersome. Thus, under CA's solution,
"[a]ll programming would become virtually impossible to watch as
187. Adelstein, supra note 90, at 2-3.
188. CSC Complaint, supra note 59, at 18-19.
189. FCC Complaint, supra note 9, at 4; FTC Complaint, supra note 9, at 2.
190. CSC Complaint, supra note 59, at 5.
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viewers get distracted by pop-ups flashing the word 'advertisement'
interrupting scene after scene." 191 While the CSC and CA do not
request an outright ban on all product placements, the practical effect
of their requested pop-up and lengthy pre-movie notices would be to
render much content virtually unwatchable.1
92
Additionally, by requiring separate disclosure for all forms of
product placement, both the CSC and CA necessarily assume the
public is unable to anticipate any type of placement. However, due to
the legitimate need for props, the public will often expect visual
placements (and consequently mixed placements). 193 A consumer who
expects a visual placement can factor that information into his or her
product evaluation prior to purchase. Where consumers can easily
evaluate a product, the FTC is reluctant to issue a complaint based on
a deceptive act or practice. 194 The FTC correctly stated that "given the
fact-specific nature of the deception analysis under Section 5, a one-
size-fits-all rule or guide would not be the most effective approach to
addressing any potential for deception in some forms of product
placement." 195 However, where the need for props is absent, the most
effective approach for addressing potential deception in non-visual
placement requires targeted and specific disclosure rules.
Current FCC disclosure requirements sufficiently regulate
visual placements in broadcast media. The prop exception
accommodates both production needs and audience expectations.
Where the "identification ... is [not] reasonably related to the use of
such ... property on the broadcast," audience expectation is absent
and disclosure is appropriate. 196 Non-visual placements do not fill any
expected production need and thus products offered as compensation
for such mentions are rarely (if ever) reasonably related to the use of
such property on the broadcast. Additionally, product placement is
inherently different from traditional advertising because it places ads
in content. Where program and advertisement cannot be separately
identified, a product's mere mention cannot clearly indicate
sponsorship. 97 Thus, non-visual placement does not fall into any of
the disclosure exceptions and should always require disclosure.
191. FTC Opposition, supra note 80, at 4.
192. See WLF Comments, supra note 84, at 6-7.
193. See Kielbowicz & Lawson, supra note 22, at 357-58; Savare, supra note 19, at
357.
194. FTC Deception Statement, supra note 36, at 5.
195. FTC Response, supra note 3, at 3 (emphasis added).
196. 47 U.S.C. § 317(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
197. FCC Complaint, supra note 9, at 4.
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B. Viable Disclosure Requirement Possibilities
1. FCC Regulations
As stated above, the FCC has the authority to require
disclosure on matter broadcast via television or radio.198  FCC
Commissioner Adelstein has stated that "[d]isclosures should . . .be
meaningful. A disclosure that appears on screen for a split second
during the credits in small type that no one could possibly read
without pausing their DVR - and pulling out a magnifying glass -
could not possibly qualify."199 However, the massive scope of product
placement presents a daunting obstacle in the way of detailed product
disclosure requirements. Overly detailed disclosure requirements will
be ineffective or annoying, while no disclosure will fail to inform the
public "by whom they are being persuaded."200 Thus, disclosure must
inform the viewer or listener without being ineffectively cumbersome.
Various recommended solutions addressing product placement
generally may be applied to non-visual placements specifically. One
commentator has suggested "a voluntary crawl at the bottom of the
screen" that could be turned on or off.20 1 The same commentator
suggested alternatively "includ[ing] a disclaimer either at the
beginning or end of the show, to publicize [a] website address where
viewers could go for a list of the specifications of all product
integrations and the names of sponsors."20 2 Another commentator
suggested "the creation of an additional rating that alerts viewers to
the nature and extent to which the forthcoming program contains
product placements."203 A successful parental guidance rating system
already informs television viewers, and a similar non-visual
placement rating system may present the most viable solution for both
radio and television. Additionally, a website should be made available
listing all companies and products with non-visual placements in a
198. See 47 U.S.C. § 317.
199. Adelstein, supra note 12, at 17.
200. Applicability of Sponsorship Identification Rules, supra note 20.
201. Benjamin, supra note 11.
202. Id. As of 2003 only 54.7% of American households had internet access. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, COMPUTER AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003 2 tbl.A
(2005), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/p23-208.pdf. As such, this
solution may not sufficiently inform a large percentage of the population. However, many
people without home access may be able to connect to the internet at a public library or
other location.
203. Savare, supra note 19, at 378.
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broadcast program for those viewers and listeners who wish to fully
inform themselves.
2. FTC Regulations
The FTC has the "power to require a company . . . to
affirmatively disclose information without which the company[ ]
might deceive the public. ' 20 4 One possibility is for the FTC to require
notice similar to the current parental advisory sticker or movie
rating20 5 systems on CDs, books, periodicals, and DVDs. This simple
disclosure option would not result in substantially increased cost to
the consumer. Further, choosing a format already familiar to
consumers will keep informational costs down.206 Once alerted to the
presence and extent of non-visual placement, the consumer will be
able to make a more informed purchasing decision. Thus, with
appropriate notice, the consumer will no longer be unfairly deceived.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this note is not to vilify advertisers or product
placement. Without advertising revenue, much of our favorite
entertainment would not exist. Further, product placement offers
advertisers a vital tool in a world of digital video recording such as
TiVo and commercial-free satellite radio. As stated by FCC
Commissioner Adelstein: "[t]here is nothing inherently wrong with
product placement - so long as it is disclosed as required by law."
20 7
The law requires sponsorship disclosure any time a party pays
more than nominal consideration to insert covert promotions into
broadcast matter. 208 The disclosure must be meaningful so that the
public is able understand "the nature and source of the material they
are hearing and seeing and can place it in its proper context."
20 9
Without separate disclosure, non-visual product placement is
indistinguishable from an unpaid product mention. Non-visual
placement does not clearly identify itself as an advertisement, and
204. Russell J. Davis, Annotation, Power of Federal Trade Commission to Issue
Order Requiring Corrective Advertising, 46 A.L.R. FED. 905 (2002); see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
45(b) (2000); Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562 F.2d 749, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
205. The MPAA is a self-regulatory agency that developed the movie rating system.
Savare, supra note 19, at 378.
206. For example, rather than a massive informational campaign, the FTC may be
able to simply provide a rating key.
207. Adelstein, supra note 12, at 17.
208. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1212 (2005).
209. Adelstein, supra note 12, at 18.
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thereby prevents the viewer from understanding the nature and
source of the material. Additionally, non-visual placement does not
qualify for any disclosure exception, and therefore should not require
an inefficient context-specific inquiry. As such, affirmative disclosure
requirements targeting non-visual placement are needed to ensure
that sponsorships are clearly and comprehensively identified.
The law also declares unfair or deceptive acts or practices
unlawful. An act is unfair if it injures consumers or violates public
policy. 210  Further, a deceptive act or practice consists of a
"representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the
consumer," who is "acting reasonably in the circumstances" where the
representation, omission or practice is "material."211  Non-visual
placement is unfair because it causes a significant monetary injury
that is not avoidable by the consumer. It is deceptive because a
reasonable consumer assuming the absence of a placement may
detrimentally rely upon this assumption. It follows that an
affirmative disclosure requirement targeting non-visual placement is
necessary to remedy this faulty assumption and prevent further injury
as the use of non-visual placement expands.
While various regulatory options exist, perhaps the most viable
broadcast disclosure requirement option is a mandatory audio or
visual rating system. A similar mandatory label may viably identify
placements within other non-broadcast media products. Whatever the
method used, the agencies have a statutory obligation to ensure that
the public "know[s] by whom they are being persuaded," and that the
public is not unfairly mislead or deceived.
212
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210. FTC Unfairness Statement, supra note 47, at 2.
211. FTC Deception Statement, supra note 36, at 1.
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